Black Cat, White Cat | InfoSec aXioms

Ofer Shezaf highlights one of the fundamental ways of categorizing security tools in his post Black Cat, White Cat | InfoSec aXioms.

Black listing, sometimes called negative security or “open by default”, focuses on catching the bad guys by detecting attacks.  Security controls such as Intrusion Prevention Systems and Anti-Virus software use various methods to do so. The most common method to detect attacks matching signatures against network traffic or files. Other methods include rules which detect conditions that cannot be expressed in a pattern and abnormal behavior detection.

 White listing on the other hand allows only known good activity. Other terms associated with the concept are positive security and “closed by default” and policy enforcement. White listing is commonly embedded in systems and the obvious example is the authentication and authorization mechanism found in virtually every information system. Dedicated security controls which use white listing either ensures the build-in policy enforcement is used correctly or provide a second enforcement layer. The former include configuration and vulnerability assessment tools while the latter include firewalls.

Unfortunately, when manufactures apply the term “Next Generation” to firewalls, they may be misleading the marketplace.  As Ofer says, a firewall, by definition, performs white listing, i.e. policy enforcement. One of the key functions of a NGFW is the ability to white list applications. This means the applications that are allowed must be defined in the firewall policy. On the other hand, if you are defining applications that are to be blocked, that’s black listing, and not a firewall.

Also note that Next Generation Firewalls also perform Intrusion Prevention, which is a black listing function. So clearly, NGFWs perform white listing and black listing functions. But to truly earn the right to call a network security appliance a “Next Generation” Firewall, the device must enable application white listing. Adding “application awareness” as a blacklist function is nice, but not a NGFW. For more information, I have written about Next Generation Firewalls and the difference between UTMs and NGFWs.

 

Stiennon’s confusion between UTM and Next Generation Firewall

Richard Stiennon has published a blog post on Netasq, a European UTM vendor called, A brief history of firewalls and the rise of the UTM. I found the post indirectly from Alan Shimmel’s post about it.

Stiennen seems to think that Next Generation Firewalls are just a type of UTM. Shimmel also seems to go along with Stiennon’s view. Stiennon gives credit to IDC for defining the term UTM, but has not acknowledged Gartner’s work in defining Next Generation Firewall.

My purpose here is not to get into a debate about terms like UTM and NGFW. The real question is which network security device provides the best network security “prevention” control. The reality is that marketing people have so abused the terms UTM and NGFW, you cannot depend on the term to mean anything. My remarks here are based on Gartner’s definition of Next Generation Firewall which they published in October 2009.

All the UTMs I am aware of, whether software-based or with hardware assist, use port-based (stateful inspection) firewall technology. They may do a lot of other things like IPS, URL filtering and some DLP, but these UTMs have not really advanced the state (pardon the pun) of “firewall” technology. These UTMs do not enable positive (default-deny) network traffic control up through the application level. They depend on the negative control model of their IPS and application modules/blades.

Next Generation Firewalls, on the other hand, as defined by Gartner’s 2009 research report, enable positive network traffic control policies from the network layer up through the application layer. Therefore true NGFWs are something totally new and were developed in response to the changes in the way applications are now written. In the early days of TCP/IP, port-based firewalls worked well because each new application ran on its assigned port. For example, SMTP on port 25. In the 90s, you could be sure that traffic that ran on port 25 was SMTP and that SMTP would run only port 25.

About ten years ago applications began using port-hopping, encryption, tunneling, and a variety of other techniques to circumvent port-based firewalls. In fact, we have now reached the point where port-based firewalls are pretty much useless at controlling traffic between networks of different trust levels. UTM vendors responded by adding application identification functionality using their intrusion detection/prevention engines. This is surely better than nothing, but IPS engines use a negative enforcement model, i.e. default allow, and only monitor a limited number of ports. A true NGFW monitors all 65,535 ports for all applications at all times.

In closing, there is no doubt about the value of a network security “prevention” control performing multiple functions. The real question is, does the device you are evaluating fulfill its primary function of reducing the organization’s attack surface by (1) enabling positive control policies from the network layer through the application layer, and (2) doing it across all 65,535 ports all the time?

 

 

 

 

 

OAuth – the privacy time bomb

Andy Baio writes in Wired about the privacy dangers of OAuth.

While OAuth enables OAuth Providers to replace passwords with tokens to improve the security of authentication and authorization to third party applications, in many cases it gives those applications access to much more of your personal information than is needed for them to perform their functions. This only increases the risk associated with breaches of personal data at these third party application providers.

Andy focuses on Gmail because the risk of using them as an OAuth Provider is greater. As Andy says:

For Twitter, the consequences are unlikely to be serious since almost all activity is public. For Facebook, a mass leak of private Facebook photos could certainly be embarrassing. But for Gmail, I’m very concerned that it opens a major security flaw that’s begging to be exploited.

“You may trust Google to keep your email safe, but do you trust a three-month-old Y Combinator-funded startup created by three college kids? Or a side project from an engineer working in his 20 percent time? How about a disgruntled or curious employee of one of these third-party services?”

If you are using your GMail (Google) credentials to just authenticate to a third party application, why should the third party application have access to your emails? In the case of Xobni or Unsubscribe, for example, you do need to give them access rights because they are providing specific functions that need access to Gmail content. But why does Unsubscribe need access to message content when all it really needs is access to email senders? When you decided to use Unsubscribe, why can’t you limit them to only your Senders? The bottom line is that by using OAuth you are trusting the third party applications not to abuse the privileges you are giving them and that they have implemented effective security controls.

While Andy provides some good advice to people who use their Google, Twitter, or Facebook credentials for other applications, there is no technical reason for the third party applications to get access to so much personal information. In other words, when you allow a third party application to use one of your primary applications (OAuth Providers) for authentication and/or authorization, you should be able to control the functions and data to which the third party has access. In order for this to happen, the Googles, Facebooks, and Twitters must build in more fine-grained access controls.

At present, the OAuth providers do not seem to be motivated to limit access to user content by third party applications based on the needs of those applications. One reason might be that most users simply don’t realize how much access they are giving to third party applications when they use an OAuth Provider. With no user pressure requesting finer grained access, why would the OAuth Providers bother?

Aside from lack of user pressure, it seems to me that the OAuth Providers are economically motivated to maintain the status quo for two reasons. First, they are competing with each other to become the cornerstone for their users’ online lives and want keep the OAuth user interface as simple as possible. In other words, if authorization is too fine grained, users will have too many choices and will decide not to use that OAuth Provider. Second, the OAuth Providers want to keep things as simple as possible for third party developers to attract them.

I would hate to see the Federal Government get involved to force the OAuth Providers to provide more fine-grained access control. But I am afraid that a few highly publicized breaches will have that affect.

As Enterprises are moving to a Zero Trust Model, so must consumers.

 

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

You Can Never Really Get Rid of Botnets

You Can Never Really Get Rid of Botnets.

Gunter Ollmann, the Vice President of Research at Damballa, provides insight into botnets in general and specifically into the Kelihos botnet takedown.

What is lost in these disclosures is an appreciation of number of people and breadth of talent that is needed to build and operate a profitable criminal botnet business.  Piatti and the dotFREE Group were embroiled in the complaint because they inadvertently provisioned the DNS with which the botnet was dependent upon. Other external observers and analysts of the Kelihos botnet believe it to be a relative of the much bigger and more damaging Waledac botnet, going as far as naming a Peter Severa as the mastermind between both botnets.

Botnets are a business. Like any successful business they have their own equivalents of financiers, architects, construction workers and even routes to market.

Past attempts to takedown botnets have focused on shutting down the servers that command the infected zombie computers. Given the agile nature of modern botnet design, the vast majority of attempts have failed. Microsoft’s pursuit of the human operators behind botnets such as Kelihos and Waledac are widely seen as the most viable technique for permanently shutting them down. But, even then, there are problems that still need to be addressed.

While taking down botnet servers is a worthy activity for companies like Microsoft, enterprises still must deal with finding and remediating compromised endpoints.

Cloud Provider security requirements

Grok Computer Security: I’ll tell you what I want, what I really, really want from a Cloud Provider.

Micheal Berman, the CTO of Catbird, summarizes his cloud provider requirements. For security, he is looking for:

  • Auditing: network and management
  • Control: policy and assurance
  • Metrics: continuous and interoperable
Are these capabilities to be provided by the cloud provider or should the enterprise adopt a solution it can use across multiple cloud providers? What about compatibility with private cloud deployments?

 

Anticipating The Future of User Account Access Sharing

Anticipating The Future of User Account Access Sharing.

Insightful post by Lenny Zeltser regarding teenagers and adults sharing sharing accounts. i.e. sharing passwords.

Of course, those of us in security find this horrifying. Teenagers see this as a way of expressing affection. Adults in business do this to expedite accomplishing goals.

Can Security Awareness Training effectively communicate the risks of this behavior?

Encryption Key Management Primer – Requirement 3.6 « PCI Guru

Encryption Key Management Primer – Requirement 3.6 « PCI Guru.

Insightful article on PCI DSS requirement 3.6 – encryption key management, which is very complex when done manually. If you doubt it, read this article.

The PCIGuru also points out that “… for users of PGP or hardware security module (HSM), you will have no problem complying with the sub-requirements of 3.6.”

 

Financial Cryptography: Why Threat Modelling fails in practice

“…threat modelling will always fail in practice, because by definition, threat modelling stops before practice.”

via Financial Cryptography: Why Threat Modelling fails in practice.

Insightful post highlighting the difference between threat and risk.

Let us now turn that around and consider *threat modelling*. By its nature, threat modelling only deals with threats and not risks and it cannot therefore reach out to its users on a direct, harmful level. Threat modelling is by definition limited to theoretical, abstract concerns. It stops before it gets practical, real, personal.

Risks are where harm is done to users. Risk modelling therefore is the only standard of interest to users.

 

Wall St. Journal and NYTimes interest in Information Security

The subject of Information Security and its risks to the enterprise is becoming more mainstream. Last week, the World Economic Forum called out Cyber Attacks as a top risk. Today both the Wall St. Journal and the New York Times have significant information security articles:

Bassam Alghanims Email-Hacking Allegations Against His Brother, Kutayba, Exposes Hackers-For-Hire Trade – WSJ.com.

Flaws in Videoconferencing Systems Make Boardrooms Vulnerable – NYTimes.com.

 

Adopt Zero Trust to help secure the extended enterprise

John Kindervag, a principal analyst at Forrester, has developed an interesting approach to securing the extended enterprise. He calls it the Zero Trust Model which he describes in this article: Adopt Zero Trust to help secure the extended enterprise.

First,  let me say I am not connected to Forrester in any way. I am connected to John Kindervag on LinkedIn based on a relationship from a prior company.

Second, the Zero Trust Model rings true for me in that the incident data available for review shows that we must assume that prevention controls can never be perfect. We must assume that (1) devices will be compromised including user authentication credentials and (2) some users interacting with systems will behave badly either accidentally or on purpose.

John uses the term Extended Enterprise to refer to an organization’s functional network which extends to (1) remote and mobile employees and contractors connecting via smartphones and tablets as well as laptops, and (2) business partners.

The Zero Trust Model of information security simplifies how information security is conceptualized by assuming there are no longer “trusted” interfaces, applications, traffic, networks or users. It takes the old model — “trust but verify” — and inverts it, since recent breaches have proven when an organization trusts, it doesn’t verify.

Here are the three basic ideas behind the Zero Trust Model:

  1. Ensure all resources are accessed securely – regardless of location
  2. Adopt the principle of least privilege, and strictly enforce access control
  3. Inspect and log all traffic

Here are Kindervag’s (Forrester) top recommendations:

  • Conduct a data discovery and classification project
  • Embrace encryption
  • Deploy NAV (Network Analysis & Visibility) tools to watch dataflows and user behavior
  • Begin designing a zero-trust network
The article provides some detail on each of these key ideas and recommendations.